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Oceans of Trouble: Domestic Influence on International Fisheries Cooperation in the
North Atlantic and the Barents Sea
Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir ∗
Abstract
How do states allocate joint fish stocks that straddle international boundaries? What factors
determine who gets what during international negotiations between fishing states? These questions
strike at the heart of the literature on international cooperation, and thus answering them will shed
light not simply on international and transboundary fisheries management but also on the general
challenges of international cooperation. This paper examines how domestic groups influence
negotiators and thus the ultimate terms of international agreements. The research focuses on seven
agreements spanning 20 years signed by Norway and Iceland managing four shared fish stocks that
straddle national and international waters. The main conclusion suggests that a state with a powerful
domestic interest group usually gets a more favorable agreement when negotiating with a state with a
weaker domestic interest groups.

1. Introduction
Between 1980 and 1999, Iceland and Norway, along with other states, signed seven
agreements aimed at dividing shared fish stocks. 1 These seven agreements represent all the
distributive agreements the two states have signed to allocate and manage four shared fish
stocks: Icelandic capelin, Norwegian spring-spawning herring, Arctic cod, and deep-sea
ocean perch. While the conflicts between Iceland and Norway have been solved and the
solutions successfully implemented, these agreements vary greatly in how much each state
gets allocated of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), 2 as shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
This difference in the distributive outcomes of negotiations involving the same states,
negotiating within the same issue area begs the question: What explains variation in
allocation, which is found both across stocks, and in the case of capelin, over time?
Answering this question empirically requires a close look at the actual bargaining process and
the constraints negotiators face in reaching an agreement.
When analyzing how states divide a common resource, the role of domestic politics is
prominent. When negotiating fishing rights, the governments entering into agreements must
consider the will of their own fishermen, 3 who by and large are private actors. Any
agreement on dividing shared fish stocks directly impacts the economic viability of these
∗ A number of institutions and people have assisted with this research project. Research support came from the
Icelandic Research Council (Rannís), a NATO Basic Fellowship, the American-Scandinavian Foundation and
the Agricultural Bank of Iceland. Among others, the author wishes to thank Andy Sobel, Roger Petersen, Jack
Knight, Alf Håkon Hoel and Jennifer Seely for helpful comments on previous versions on this paper. In addition
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers who provided constructive comments during the review process. This
work is better because of them, but in the end any errors are wholly my responsibility.
1. While all but one agreement involves other states, the focus here is on the interaction between Iceland and
Norway as the two biggest fishing states bordering the North Atlantic. As the two key actors in the area it is
clear that if Iceland and Norway fail to agree, there will be no agreement managing a stock.
2. The Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is the quantity that can be taken from a stock each year. Ideally, the TAC
should balance catch levels with long term viability of the stock.
3. This article uses the term “fishermen” to refer to individuals involved in the capture fishery in Iceland and
Norway. This term accurately represents the gender composition of the capture industry and its interest groups.

private interests. If government negotiators fail to accommodate the fishing industry,
fishermen can render an agreement ineffective in two ways. First, fishermen can cheat.
Because of the low marginal cost of fishing, the high cost of monitoring and enforcing
agreements, and the lack of information about the resource, cheating is always going to be a
threat to any agreement. Second, fishermen can impose political costs on the government by
protesting an agreement.
Explaining the different distributive outcomes across stocks and over time will
proceed on two levels. At the international level, it is usually clear from the beginning of the
negotiations which state should get the largest share of the resource. As “Section 3—The
Role of International Law” shows, this decision is based on whether or not the participating
state is a coastal state and where most of the stock resides. However, these principles cannot
explain the choice of a solution concept that serves as a baseline for allocation, a decision
crucial to explaining the final distributive outcome. At the international level, the Law of the
Sea regime provides states with solution concepts, such as historical rights or scientific
considerations, that they can apply to allocate straddling stocks. Each negotiating round
entails choosing a solution concept to determine a baseline for the distribution of a stock as
explained in “Section 4—How Domestic Politics Matter.” The selection of a baseline affects
the final distributive outcome of the negotiations and thus has significant economic
consequences for domestic fishermen.
Departing from other accounts of domestic sources of international cooperation,
which emphasize institutional variation such as legislative ratification constraining
negotiators, I argue that societal factors—specifically organized interest groups—provide the
important bargaining constraints for negotiators. 4 I show that interest group presence on the
negotiating committee directly affects the selection of a baseline and thus impact the
distributive outcome of the negotiations. Interest groups in Iceland and Norway representing
the fisheries are crucial players in the bargaining process at two time-points. First, prior to
entering negotiations, government officials meet with interest group leaders to decide what
negotiators will ask for in the negotiations and what they can accept as a counteroffer.
Second, interest groups have representatives on the actual negotiating committees, and can
thus discuss offers and counteroffers as they are presented.
However, interest group presence on the delegation is not enough to ensure influence
on the choice of a baseline. Ultimately the power of the interest group vis-à-vis the
government impacts the interest groups ability to get what it wants. That is, a powerful
interest group will have a better chance of constraining the government delegation than a
weak interest group. More constraints translate into a narrower bargaining space, which gives
the government less freedom to make and receive offers without consideration of the interest
group. But in the case of a weak interest group, government delegates will have a freer reign
to accept and receive offers to achieve the goal of solving a conflict, without having to worry
about possible domestic political costs. Hence a change in the relative bargaining power
between interest groups and government officials domestically affects the ability of interest
groups to constrain government negotiators in the international arena. An interest group that
is losing power is less constraining for negotiators as it is less able to threaten political
problems when interest group does not like the deals the government is proposing at the
international level.

4. A constraint on a negotiator translates into bargaining strength for the constrained nation as it narrows the
bargaining space and thus allows a negotiator to reject offers by citing domestic concerns over the offer. See for
example Putnam and Bayne 1984; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Mo 1994, 1995; Milner
1997; Martin 2000; and Tarar 2001.
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Specifically, Icelandic interest groups have remained powerful domestically
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while a decline in power of the key Norwegian interest
group has made it less able to secure favorable policy outcomes in its dealings with the
Norwegian government. At the international level these changes in power domestically have
led to Iceland increasingly getting a better deal than Norway in negotiations over allocation
of shared fish stocks.
This paper proceeds in the following manner. First, I discuss the theoretical literature
on the domestic sources of international cooperation. Second, I discuss how the Law of the
Sea influences the outcome of negotiations. I then move on to the empirical study of the
negotiations between Iceland and Norway, where highly organized and involved interest
groups set constraints on negotiators before and during international negotiations. In this
section, I discuss the source of interest group power, as well as how the power and ability to
influence policy has changed over time. Finally, I show how interest group participation in
the negotiations has influenced the selection of the baseline for the negotiations, which in
turn influences the distribution of catch allocations.
2. Bargaining Constraints and Political Costs
Theories of how domestic politics influence international cooperation have proliferated in
recent years. 5 But a generalizable theory has not emerged as to who and what helps or
hinders states in the bargaining process. Scholars have pointed to an electoral connection, 6
ratification procedures 7 and the role of domestic constraints, specifically veto players 8 as
influencing the outcome.
In the case of Iceland and Norway, electoral considerations have not influenced the
distributive outcome of the negotiations. Upcoming elections in Iceland seem to have made
the 1999 cod agreement possible, but the elections did not influence the actual distributive
outcome. Furthermore, formal ratification by the legislature cannot explain the variance in the
distributive outcomes of the negotiations between Iceland and Norway either. Formal
ratification procedures are thought to constrain the bargaining space, i.e. the room negotiators
have to reach an agreement. Required ratification has been shown to lead to a better result for
the state that has a formal ratification procedure. 9 In the case of Iceland and Norway there is
no evidence that legislative ratification matters for the negotiating outcome.
The third strand of research on domestic influence on international cooperation
focuses on the role of domestic constraints in defining the bargaining space. Broadly
speaking these constraints can be thought of as veto players, defined as individuals or
institutions whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo. 10 The status quo in
this case being unregulated fishing. Jongryn Mo argues that domestic pressure can constrain a
negotiator, and the level of constraint depends on the distribution of power between the
negotiator and the domestic interests. 11 In a later paper, Mo argues that negotiators can
impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent (e.g. an
interest group). 12 His model also finds that if the preferences of the agent and the bureaucrat
differ too greatly, the agent will not get veto power. There is evidence of this happening once
5. Putnam and Bayne 1984; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Mo 1994, 1995; Milner 1997;
Martin 2000; and Tarar 2001.
6. Putnam and Bayne 1984.
7. Milner 1997; and Martin 2000.
8. Mo 1994, 1995; and Tarar 2001.
9. Milner 1997.
10. Tsebelis 1995, 1999.
11. Mo 1994.
12. Mo 1995.
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in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway. By having interest groups as an integral part
of the negotiating committee, both Iceland and Norway narrow their bargaining space and
thus restrict their alternatives to make and accept offers. But in the case of the 1999 cod
agreement, the two governments decided to leave the interest groups out of the negotiation
committees because their preferences were too far away from the preferences of the
government, especially in Norway.
All of the above work has one fundamental shortcoming in that it looks only at what
happens when one state is constrained by domestic factors in the negotiations. The other state
in the bargaining process is assumed not to have any constraints at all. Tarar extends the work
on the impact of domestic constraints on distributive outcomes and develops a model where
both states have domestic constraints on their ability to make and accept offers. 13 He shows
that if one negotiator has high domestic constraints while the other negotiator only has
moderate or low constraints, the highly constrained negotiator will have a bargaining
advantage when bargaining with a less constrained party. Tarar’s result is applicable to the
negotiations between Iceland and Norway. It is clear from the evidence that Iceland is more
constrained by its powerful interest groups than Norway, whose key interest group loses
power in the 1980s and 1990s. These factors have a direct influence on the outcome, giving
Iceland a bargaining edge against Norway.
Bargaining constraints can be defined as a negotiator’s ability to receive and make
offers. That is, at the beginning of negotiations, most states have a mechanism to decide how
much they are willing to offer and how much they are willing to settle for in order to reach an
agreement. How the bargaining space, i.e. the maximum a state is willing to offer and the
minimum it is willing to accept, is determined domestically varies among states. For
example, it can include meetings with stakeholders, such as the relevant interest groups or
key members of the legislatures. The goal of having a defined bargaining space at the outset
of international negotiations is to minimize domestic political costs once an agreement is
reached.
Domestic political cost to politicians can come in three forms. First, if the
dissatisfaction with an agreement is widespread, it can potentially lessen the ability of
politicians to be reelected. Second, politicians have limited time and having to spend a
significant amount of time and energy defending an international agreement takes away from
the time they could spend on more fruitful political pursuits. Finally, disagreement and
opposition to an agreement, especially among key stakeholders, makes enforcement and
hence compliance more difficult, especially if private interests are asked to curb profitable
behavior.
3. The Role of International Law
As discussed above, the first level of the explanation over the variation in distributive
outcomes lies at the international level. Scholars studying international cooperation have
argued that the existence of international regimes fosters cooperation. 14 The “United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea” and “The Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks,” form the Law of the Sea regime that governs oceans and fisheries. 15
Regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
13. Tarar 2001.
14. Krasner 1983; Young 1989; and Young 1999.
15. In the interest of space, the latter will henceforth be referred to as the Straddling Stocks Agreement.
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international relations.” 16 However, while regimes promote cooperation, they do not dictate
the nature of the cooperation, i.e. who should get what and on which grounds. For example,
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which concluded in 1982,
and the subsequent 1995 Straddling and Highly Migratory Stocks Agreement lay out broad
solution concepts that states can use to negotiate a baseline to allocate common resources.
Iceland and Norway have signed both agreements, making them binding.
However, while the agreements mandate cooperation, they do not dictate which
solution concept should be adopted and therefore they cannot explain the variance in the
distributive outcome. Participating states have absolute power to decide how they use the
guidelines found in the Law of the Sea, as described below. They therefore use the law in an
instrumental fashion, focusing on the solution concepts that will give each state the largest
share of the resource being divided amongst them. Different baselines will yield different
proportions of a shared stock as discussed later. But neither agreement discusses how these
guidelines should be translated into an actual percentage distribution of a particular stock.
Interviews with bureaucrats and interest group leaders in Norway and Iceland indicate
that the role of international law emerges as providing solution concepts for cooperation and
thus narrows the number of possible outcomes. 17 That is, states act instrumentally to
maximize their share of the Total Allowable Catch. The interviews with participants in the
negotiations reveal three primary solution concepts that have reference in the 1982 United
Nations Law of the Sea and the recent Straddling Stocks Agreement signed in 1995.
First, Article 63 of the 1982 Law of the Sea calls for cooperation among coastal states
and high-seas fishing states in managing straddling fish stocks. 18 This duty to cooperate is
reinforced in Article 5(a) of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement. 19 Taken together, the
Law of the Sea regime provides for the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and highseas fishing states in managing straddling stocks. If a fish stock is found partially within the
waters of a country, that country is a coastal state. If a country has no traces of a stock in its
waters, but its ships partake in the fishery in international waters, it is labeled a high-seas
fishing state. The overarching principle of the Law of the Sea is that coastal states are
responsible for the maintenance of stocks, while high-seas fishing states have an obligation
not to deplete a particular stock. Interviews reveal that in practice this principle means that in
most agreements, coastal states have the right to a larger share of the stock than a high-seas
fishing state.
Second, states can use the concept of zonal attachment 20 to allocate shared resouces.
Article 5 of the Straddling Stock Agreement argues that management measures should be
based on the best scientific evidence available and the calculation of zonal attachment is a
scientific construct which estimates how much of the stock is found within a particular
16. Krasner 1983, p. 2.
17. Twenty-seven individuals were interviewed for this study, 11 in Iceland in the fall of 1998 and 16 in Norway
during the summer of 1999. Interviewees included bureaucrats and interest groups leaders who collectively have
been part of all the negotiations between Iceland and Norway for the past 20 years. Given the small number of
interviewees and the sensitivity of some of the negotiations, most interviewees requested their identity be kept
secret. The questions asked were similar across all interviewees, focusing on the negotiating process, how
nations decide their bargaining positions, who gets to participate, what the relationship between the different
actors was and so forth. In summarizing the interviews, care has been taken to focus on answers to questions
that were echoed by two or more interviewees.
18. United Nations 1982.
19. United Nations 1995.
20. Zonal attachment is a scientific construct which estimates how much on average of a straddling stock is
found within each Exclusive Economic Zone. If used as a basis for allocation it is a straightforward concept for
allocation that is the least political of the possible allocation mechanisms. One thing to remember is that not all
stocks have enough information available in order for zonal attachment to be calculated. That is the case with
oceanic redfish, a relatively recent fishery far from shore and thus understudied scientifically.
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economic zone at any given time. 21 Ideally, using zonal attachment to divide a stock reduces
the politics involved in the allocation if everyone party to the negotiations agrees with the
calculations. That is, if governments accepted scientific calculations where stocks reside as
basis for distribution, there would really be no need for negotiations. However, zonal
attachment often complements the coastal state provision, i.e. who should get the largest
share, but is rarely strictly applied, because goverments like to have the flexbility to negotiate
a different allocation.
Finally, provision 62(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea suggests that states have to
repsect historical rights to fisheries. 22 This provision is the most politically malleable
provision in the negotiations being studied here, and as such enjoys vast popularity. The
ability to rely on the provision that allows for more negotiations, allows negotiators to
bargain harder and try to get more of the resource than strict zonal attachment would dictate.
Historical rights is an elastic concept as there are often heated discussions about when history
should “begin” and to what extend such rights should matter in the final allocation. Hence,
historical rights have emerged as the baseline for allocation most of the negotiations in this
study.
4. How Domestic Politics Matter
The influence of domestic constraints on the negotiations is crucial when it comes to
explaining the choice of a particular solution concept as a baseline for the final distributive
outcome. It is clear that the size of the domestic constraint, can and does change over time in
such a way that it influences the choice of a baseline and thus the final allocation. In the
actual negotiations, the choice of a baseline is primarily between the use of zonal attachment
and historical rights. The decision between them is a political decision based on domestic
considerations, framed by the relevant interests groups party to nearly all the negotiations.
Entering negotiations, each state tries to push for a solution that yields the most amount of
stock, based on considerations of coastal states, zonal attachment and historical rights. During
the negotiations, however, the negotiators adjust these preferences to achieve an agreement
and one solution concept emerges as the baseline for distribution of the straddling stock. For
example, during the herring negotiations, considerations of the historical rights of Iceland
granted it a bigger share than zonal attachment would have, while zonal attachment has
dominated capelin agreements. Table 2 shows the initial preferences for Iceland and Norway
at the beginning of each negotiating round.
[Table 2 about here]
In all cases, Iceland and Norway initially prefer different baselines for allocating the
stocks. The individual baselines were decided upon domestically through discussions with the
relevant interest groups, prior to the international negotiations. The decision is based on
which solution will yield the biggest share of the catch for fishermen. As the last column of
the table shows, the outcome is that Iceland usually gets its way. This finding begs the
question of why Iceland’s position is so strong? The answer lies in the domestic constraints
the two states face during the negotiating process. The key constraint in both Iceland and
Norway is the interest groups representing the fisheries. These groups are key actors in both
countries, the important difference being that their ability to influence the process is not equal
in the two countries and, more importantly, it has changed over time.
21. United Nations 1995.
22. United Nations 1982.
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5. Interest Groups as Pivotal Players
Analysis of the interviews reveals that interest groups are crucial players in the negotiating
process and, as such, influence who gets what. Interest groups play a prominent role in the
actual negotiating process at two stages – in preparation for the negotiations and during the
negotiations. Having a delegate on the actual negotiating committees grants interest groups
the power to suggest solutions and prevent unfavorable solutions from being adopted. That is,
they essentially act as veto players. In all but two cases—the 1996 herring agreement and the
1999 cod agreement—interest groups had members on the actual negotiating committees. In
1996, the key Norwegian interest group—Norges Fiskarlag—withdrew from the herring
negotiations. In the case of cod, following a breakdown of these negotiations in 1996, interest
groups were excluded from both sides because of strong interest group opposition in Norway
to any agreement with Iceland.
The fact that Norges Fiskarlag left the herring negotiations meant that the Norwegian
government was freer to reach an agreement with the states party to the agreement as the
declining importance of Norges Fiskarlag meant that the government did not have to worry
about political fallout from the agreement. During the cod negotiations, when interest groups
from both sides were excluded from the delegations, interviews indicate that the Icelandic
interest groups were better informed of developments than Norges Fiskarlag, which had no
access to information about the negotiations.
Interest groups exercise their influence on the negotiating process before and during
negotiations, but are powerless to alter the outcome afterward. Before negotiations begin, the
governments in both countries consult with the interest group about goals of the negotiations.
My interviewees on the government side in both countries described the pre-negotiation
meetings as crucial to formulating their respective negotiating positions. In addition, interest
groups have representatives on the actual delegation representing the countries.
There are two similarities in interest group influence and one significant difference in
how the interviewees perceive the direct interest group influence on the negotiating process
in Iceland and Norway. First, bureaucrats in both states agree that having the interest groups
along was very important for the negotiations, both to provide information on the specifics of
the fisheries as well as a contact point to vet ideas about possible solutions to the conflict. By
being present, the interest groups can effectively veto suggestions as they arise. This is
especially true with the Icelandic delegation. The main difference between Iceland and
Norway in this respect is that the interest groups in Iceland are a more integral part of the
process than they are in Norway. “Interest groups have a great deal of influence on the
Icelandic strategy,” one Icelandic official said. A Norwegian official, however, pointed out
that it did not matter if the interest groups did not like an agreement. They had to accept what
the government did. 23
Second, interest group leaders interviewed indicated that they thought they could
influence the outcome of international negotiations, but the Icelandic interest group leaders
were more confident about their ability to directly influence the outcome of the negotiations.
“Our role in negotiations is to be advisers to the bureaucrats,” an Icelandic interest group
leader said. “It is normal that the government considers our position, otherwise we would not
participate in the process.” 24

23. Personal interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat. Interview conducted in Norway, May 5, 1999.
24. Personal interview with an Icelandic interest group leader. Interview conducted in Iceland, December 12,
1998.
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Third, interest group leaders and bureaucrats in both countries agreed that once an
agreement is reached, interest groups have no official avenues to protest an agreement. As
one Norwegian official put it: “They can’t go on strike, they can’t stop fishing.” 25
6. The Power to Influence the Policy Process
Interest groups representing fisheries are major actors within the domestic policy arena and
their influence spills over into the international arena. In both Iceland and Norway, the
fishing industry is highly organized with participation being practically universal. In Norway,
the key group is Norges Fiskarlag, while in Iceland the key group is the Association of
Icelandic Vessel Owners, which participates in negotiations along with three labor unions. By
having interest group representatives on the actual delegation, government officials seek to
minimize the political cost once an agreement is reached. Norwegian and Icelandic interest
groups, however, differ in their ability to influence their respective government and their
ability to influence the outcome has changed over time. This different ability has direct
consequences for the outcome of the international negotiations, most notably by giving
Iceland the upper hand in setting the baseline for the division of stocks, which has led to
favorable outcome for Iceland, as evident in Table 2. As Tarar shows, a country with a highly
constrained bargaining space usually gets a better deal in negotiations, in this case a higher
percentage of the TAC, than a country with a less constrained bargaining space. 26 However,
in the case of Iceland and Norway, the constraints on negotiators have not remained constant
over time and the change in power of the interest groups has influenced the choice of baseline
and thus the final allocation. The power of Norges Fiskarlag has been weakening during the
past 25 years, resulting in lessening ability to influence the Norwegian government. As a
result it has become easier for the Norwegian government to ignore Norges Fiskarlag’s
preferences. The Icelandic interest groups have, at minimum, retained their influence. This is
especially true for the Vessel Owners, who to an extent dictate policy both domestically and
at the international level.
Norway
Norwegian fishing interests are highly organized, the most important group being Norges
Fiskarlag (The Norwegian Association of Fishermen). It is unique in that it represents often
competing interests of fishing vessels and the fishermen working on the vessels. The glue that
has kept Norges Fiskarlag together since 1964 has been annual governmental subsidies to the
fishermen. Norges Fiskarlag was given a monopoly on negotiating these subsidies with the
government, which meant that if a group wanted to influence the negotiations, it had to join
the organization. The subsidies ensured fishermen’s incomes and supported settlement in the
northern regions. They reached their peak in the early 1980s, but have since all but
disappeared. Norges Fiskarlag has also exercised its influence by negotiating fisheries policy
with the government and by being able to influence appointments to important posts in the
fisheries sector. The organization’s position has also been helped by its perceived political
alliance with Norway’s most powerful political party, the Labor Party. 27
The power of the Norwegian fishing industry derives from the regional importance of
the industry. Fishing is primarily an export industry with about 90% of the products exported,
making it the second largest export industry in the country. This figure may sound
impressive, but the fact is that fisheries products only comprise about 7% of Norwegian
25. Personal interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat. Interview conducted in Norway, May 5 1999.
26. Tarar 2001.
27. Sagdahl 1982.
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exports. 28 However, two regions stand out as centers for the industry, the three northernmost
counties (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) and the west coast (Møre-Romsdal). During the
Cold War, Norwegian policy makers spent a great deal of effort and money to keep Northern
Norway populated, arguing that any significant depopulation would have made Norway more
vulnerable to Soviet influence, maybe even an invasion.
Norges Fiskarlag’s ability to influence the policy process has declined during the past
25 years. This decline has its roots in three main developments. The number of fishermen has
declined, oil production has become increasingly important to the Norwegian economy, and
the end of the Cold War lessened the importance of the northern regions of Norway,
diminishing their political influence. These changes are reflected in drastically reduced
subsidies as well as diminished interests by Norwegian parliamentarians in fisheries issues.
i. The Number of Fishermen: There has been a steady reduction in the number of fishermen
in Norway since the end of World War II. The number of fishermen was at its peak just after
World War II, when there were about 98,000 fishermen in Norway. 29 In 1962, about 56,900
fishermen caught 1.3 million tons of fish. Due to technological innovation, the total number
of fishermen was about 23,600 and the catch had doubled to 2.5 million tons of fish by
1995. 30 From 1984 to 1998, the number of full-time fishermen decreased by about 30%, from
about 22,000 in 1984 to about 15,000 in 1998. This decline has geographic dimensions. The
north, the traditional Labor stronghold and the center of the Norwegian fishing industry, has
lost ground against the industrialized west-coast fleet. This has reduced the direct political
impact of fishermen.
ii. End of the Cold War: During the Cold War, Norway pursued a policy of limited
cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, while at the same time keeping
Western allies from entering the area in any great numbers. 31 The fall of the Soviet Union
had important consequences for Northern Norway. Once the dust settled after the collapse,
the northern regions of Norway had lost some of their political importance, as the risk of
Russian invasion seemed slim. This further marginalized the North politically, as the center
of the Norwegian fishing industry.
iii. Oil Makes a Splash: The composition of Norwegian exports has undergone a fundamental
change in the past 35 years and Norway has become a major oil producer and exporter, with
oil overtaking traditional industries as the leading source of export earnings. The exports of
crude oil and natural gas increased from 2.2% of total exports in 1970 to about 48% of the
total in 1995. Meanwhile, fishing exports have remained relatively constant at about 5-9% of
total exports. The development of the oil industry has shifted the attention of politicians away
from fisheries, and lessened the relative economic importance of the fisheries.
iv. Role of Subsidies: The decrease in the number of fishermen, the increased importance of
the oil sector combined with the end of the Cold War, has lessened the ability of Norges
Fiskarlag to secure concessions from the government, evident in the elimination of subsidies
to secure fishermen’s incomes. While the original reason for the elimination of subsidies was
a domestic decision, their eventual abolishment was cemented in 1993 when Norway signed
the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement with the European Union. The change in
subsidies can be seen in Figure 1.
28. Norges Fiskarlag 1998.
29. Fløistad 1982.
30. Norsk Fiskerinæring 1996.
31. Tamnes 1997.

9

[Figure 1 about here]
Subsidies to the fishing industry increased steadily until the early 1980s. This began to
change in 1983 with a new right-wing government that wanted to make the fishing industry
self-sufficient. For the first time since 1964, the annual negotiations over the amount of
subsidies broke down. They broke down again in 1984, 1986, 1989 and 1995. In all but one
case, Norges Fiskarlag left the negotiations because of dissatisfaction with the government’s
offer, while the Labor government broke them off in 1986. In the context of Norwegian
electoral politics, one would have expected breakdowns to happen only during times of rightwing governments. The fishing regions in the north have traditionally been Labor Party
strongholds and the party has been supportive of subsidies. But looking at government
composition during these breakdowns reveals that in 1982, 1983 and 1989, there was a rightwing coalition governing Norway, while the Labor Party was in government in 1986 and
1995. This indicates that fisheries interests were losing the ability to influence even the Labor
Party, its traditional ally.
v. Diminishing Interest in the Storting: The decline in the importance of the fisheries sector
detailed above has translated into less interest in fisheries issues in the Storting. Since 1977,
there has been a steady decline in the number of items relating to the fisheries that come
before the Storting. Figure 2 shows the change in the total number of items brought before
the parliament pertaining to the fisheries. The Lowess smoother shows the trend over time. 32
[Figure 2 about here]
The figure shows a clear downward trend in parliamentary interest. The slight
increase in the late 1970s in the number of items can be attributed to the expansion of the
200-mile EEZ. The new zone required changes in numerous domestic regulations to ensure
Norwegian control over the economic zone. In the 1980s, the number of issues leveled off
and reduced slightly, but in the late 1980s the reduction accelerated, indicating that the
parliament had shifted its focus elsewhere.
Iceland
The organizational structure of the fishing industry is very different in Iceland from Norway
and interaction between the government and the interest groups much tighter and more
informal. Four main organizations are consulted and participate on behalf of the fisheries in
international negotiations. The most powerful organization is The Federation of Icelandic
Fishing Vessel Owners, which represents owners of ships larger than 40 feet. The other three
groups are labor unions: The Association of Icelandic Marine Engineer, which represents
machinists on ships; Merchant Navy and Fishing Vessels Officers Guild, representing
captains and first mates; and the Icelandic Seamen’s Federation, representing fishermen.
While the three labor unions are also consulted on all matters pertaining to the fishing
industry, their influence does not match the influence of the Vessel Owners.
The power of the Icelandic fishing industry, especially the Vessel Owners, stems from
its economic dominance. Fish and fish-related products comprise the majority of Iceland’s
export earnings. Fish products have declined from being about 95% of the total value of
32

A Lowess smoother is a smoothing function for scatter plots to show the general trend in the data. The
acronym stands for “locally weighted least squares” and the line represents a locally weighted regression based
on neighboring values to each point in the graph.
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Icelandic exports in 1960 to averaging about 75% during the past 30 years. This dominance
has given the industry access to policy-making and, according to some scholars, the ability to
dictate policy. 33
Given the importance of the fisheries for the Icelandic economy, the government has
shown great willingness to cater to the fishing industry evident in its handling of two major
issues over the past 20 years. First, by manipulating currency prices through frequent
devaluations, the Icelandic government aided this crucial export industry. Second, the
industry—and especially the Vessel Owners—significantly influenced all major changes in
fisheries policy. This was especially evident in the major policy change in the Icelandic
fisheries during the past 20 years, the adoption of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ)
system, which essentially privatized a common resource.
i. The Politics of Currency Valuation: Until 1993, the price of the Icelandic currency was
decided by the cabinet and changes were carried out by the Central Bank of Iceland. The
government used this power to help the fishing industry by devaluing the Krona during
economic slowdowns as the devaluations increased the export earnings of the industry. 34 The
policy of devaluation to aid the fishing industry was one of the main tools the government
used to manipulate the economy, and between 1977 and 1993 the Icelandic currency was
devalued 21 times. 35 While the export industry benefited, this policy contributed to rising
price levels domestically.
ii. The System of Individual Transferable Quotas: The second policy issue that reveals the
power of the Vessel Owners on the Icelandic policy-making process is the adoption of the
system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in the early 1980s to manage the declining
Icelandic fisheries. During the process of deciding which management regime to adopt the
Vessel Owners played an important role. They were deeply involved in designing,
implementing and adjusting a new system of ITQs. 36 Interest groups representing the various
aspects of the Icelandic fishing industry also participated in the process, but the Vessel
Owners were the crucial interests to the adoption of the ITQ system and their role was
indicative of their power in the development of fisheries policy in Iceland. Steingrímur
Hermannsson, prime minister during the period when the ITQ system was established,
confirms the enormous power of the Vessel Owners in his autobiography. He says that the
ITQ system was almost entirely designed by the Vessel Owners with the full support of the
Minister of Fisheries. 37 There is little indication that the power of the Vessel Owners has
diminished since the 1980s.
iii. Number of Fishermen: As discussed above, the influence of the Vessel Owners on
Icelandic political life derives from its economic importance. As in Norway the number of
fishermen has declined, but the decline has been at a much slower pace than in Norway. In
1977 there were 5,319 fishermen employed in Iceland. In 1997 the number was down to
4,582 or a reduction of 14%. But there is no strong connection between the industry and
specific political parties, as there is in Norway. Therefore, fewer votes are likely to be
distributed across the political spectrum.

33. Jónsson 1990.
34. Thjóðhagsstofnun 1988; and Committee on the Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993.
35. Thjóðhagsstofnun 1988, 1993 and 1996.
36. Jónsson 1990.
37. Eggertsson 1999.
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iv. Increased interest in the Althing: The continued importance of the fishing industry can
also be seen in the Althing, the Icelandic parliament. Figure 3 shows the trend in the number
of laws passed originating from the cabinet dealing with the fisheries.
[Figure 3 about here]
The overall trend in the number of cabinet proposals is upward, indicating that the
cabinet is increasingly preoccupied with fisheries issues. There is a dip in activity in the late
1980s following the flurry of changes accompanying the introduction of the ITQ system in
the early 1980s. The increase in the 1990s is related to further adjustment of Icelandic
fisheries management and expansion of the ITQ system. The Icelandic parliamentary data
show that politicians pay a lot of attention to the fisheries, with about 10% of all cabinet
proposals passed dealing with fisheries related issues. This indicates that the Icelandic
fisheries have at minimum retained their influence on policy making. In comparison with
Norway, it is clear that the Icelandic fisheries play a much larger role in parliamentary affairs.
This shows that Icelandic interest groups have at minimum retained their power and
hence their ability to influence the policy making in Iceland is significant. However, the
relationship between Norges Fiskarlag and the Norwegian government has changed
fundamentally and as a result, the interest group finds it increasingly difficult to influence the
government position in the negotiations and by extension influence the distributive outcome.
7. The Impact of Interest Groups During the Negotiations
This section discusses the negotiations and the differing role of interest groups in the seven
negotiations over time and across stocks. The main conclusion is that interest groups
constrain negotiators, but that these constraints change over time. Interest groups have
remained powerful to influence Icelandic negotiators, while the weakening position of
Norges Fiskarlag has led to lessening constraints on the Norwegian negotiators. This change
in relative power of the interest groups has influenced the choice of a baseline for the final
distribution of TACs between the two states, increasingly giving Iceland the most favorable
outcome.
Capelin
Norwegian and Icelandic negotiators reached the first agreement over fishing of capelin in
the Jan Mayen area on May 10th 1980. In 1984 it was time to go back to the negotiation table,
this time to add Greenland to the agreement and achieve complete management of the stock.
It took more than six years to hammer out an agreement. The third agreement was negotiated
in 1998 after Iceland cancelled the 1989 agreement on behest of the Vessel Owners. The
subsequent negotiations resulted in a smaller share for Norway. Since the first agreement in
1980, the Norwegian share of the capelin stock has declined from 15% to 8% of the TAC, or
nearly 47%.
The role of interest groups was significant in all three negotiating rounds, but over
time Norges Fiskarlag has lost its ability to influence the Norwegian negotiators, resulting in
a smaller share for Norwegian fishermen. The first division of the stock in 1980 was heavily
influenced by interest groups, and they were powerful on both sides. Initially, Icelandic
interest groups did not want Norway to get more than 10% of the TAC, while Norges
Fiskarlag pushed to get 20%. The bargaining space for the Icelandic negotiators was further
restricted by the fact that the Icelandic interest groups opposed any agreement with the
Norwegians and the fact that the Icelandic coalition government was not united behind the
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negotiations. The Socialist Party vehemently opposed any agreement that did not give Iceland
rights to unilaterally determine the TAC for capelin each year. 38 This gave Iceland a stronger
hand, but despite this, the Norwegians got 15% of the stock. This can be considered a fair
share for Norway, which until then had been catching about 12-15% of the stock each year.
At this time, Norges Fiskarlag was at the peak of its power as the oil sector was still
developing, the Cold War was alive and well, and the organization enjoyed plenty of political
attention and high subsidies.
The ink was barely dry on the 1980 agreement when it became clear that complete
management of the capelin stock was impossible without incorporating Greenland. In order
to facilitate an agreement, Iceland and Norway had to agree to give up a share of their capelin
fishery. The key issue was how much of their respective quotas the Norwegian and Icelandic
fishermen had to relinquish. Delegations representing the three countries agreed that the
division of the stock should be based upon scientific data on zonal attachment. This
agreement is the first agreement in which zonal attachment provides the baseline for the
distribution of the TAC. A 1985-6 scientific report supported by all participants showed that
between 75% and 80% of the capelin stock was in the Icelandic zone. 39 On the basis of this
report, Iceland demanded 80% of the quota. The starting point for Norway in the negotiations
was that Norway and Iceland should give proportional amounts of their respective quotas to
Greenland. This plan called for Norway and Greenland to get 13% each, leaving Iceland with
a 74% share. 40 In the end Norway and Greenland got 11% each, leaving Iceland with 78% of
the stock. 41 Iceland did not give up much from the previous allocation. Its share of the TAC
was cut only about 9% while the Norwegian share went down 27%. In the mid to late 1980s,
Norges Fiskarlag had an increasingly hostile relationship with the Norwegian government,
which had successfully cut subsidies to the industry. Increasingly, the Norwegian government
was able to ignore the demands of the industry in international negotiations.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Icelandic interest groups retained or even increased
their power. This was evident in 1998, when the Icelandic government cancelled the 1989
agreement. Interviewees in Iceland reveal that the agreement was cancelled because Icelandic
fisheries interests, specifically the Vessel Owners, were fed up with difficult relations with
Norway over the cod fishery in the Barents Sea. The Vessel Owners argued that Norway’s
share of the capelin stock and their access to Icelandic waters were great. The Vessel Owners
supported their claim by arguing that since, there was very limited capelin fishery within the
Norwegian zone around Jan Mayen, thus Norway did not have rights to an 11% share. There
was initial opposition to these demands, and an Icelandic bureaucrat said he thought
canceling the agreement was risky. “I did not think we could get a better agreement,” he said.
“I thought we had a good agreement before and I thought the risk of not having an agreement
was bad.” 42 But this prediction turned out to be wrong as the Norwegian share was further cut
by three percentage points, from 11% to 8%.
Interest group influence on the capelin negotiations has varied over time, reflecting
the changes in the relationship between the government and interest groups in the domestic
arena. Most notably, the Norwegian interest groups have lost power over the past 20 years
and are, as a result, less able to achieve policy decisions favorable to their own interests. The
Icelandic interest groups have on the other hand remained powerful and their influence is
clearly felt among the negotiators, resulting in a favorable outcome for Iceland in two of the
three negotiations.
38. Anonymous 1980.
39. Paulsen 1989.
40. Paulsen 1989.
41. Paulsen 1989.
42. Personal interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat. Interview conducted in Iceland, October 13, 1998.
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Herring
Until the late 1960s, the Norwegian-Icelandic herring stock was the second most important
fishery in Iceland and Norway. The fishery collapsed in the late 1960s and after 25 years of
rebuilding the stock in Norwegian and Russian waters, herring made a sudden reappearance
in international waters in 1994. This led to Iceland, Faeroe Islands, Denmark, Netherlands,
Germany and the UK reporting catches in 1995. 43 Negotiations were marked by heavy
interest group representation on both sides. The Icelandic interest groups pushed for using
historical rights as a baseline, as the stock had been fished primarily in Icelandic waters
before its collapse. Norwegians pushed for zonal attachment, as 90% of the stock was found
within its waters. In the end, historical rights won out which benefited Iceland and gave it a
far larger share of the stock than zonal attachment would have done.
During the first negotiations Norges Fiskarlag became increasingly disillusioned by
what they perceived as the Norwegian government’s willingness to bargain away too much of
herring stocks. As a result, they refused to send a delegate to the negotiations. Chairman
Oddmund Bye said on that occasion, “Norges Fiskarlag cannot participate in negotiating an
agreement that results in a substantial loss for Norwegian fishermen.” 44 As one interest group
interviewee said, “We thought that Norway should have gotten about 80 or 90% [of the
TAC]. In international negotiations there is always give and take, but we got 56%.” 45 Norges
Fiskarlag’s resignation from the Norwegian delegation, gave the government freer reign in
negotiating the agreement, which was clearly a priority. The Icelandic interest groups were
equally disappointed in how little the Norwegians wanted to offer. According to Kristján
Ragnarsson, chairman of the Vessel Owners, Norway offered Iceland and the Faeroese 100130 thousand tons less than what they fished the previous year. 46 But the recognition of
historical rights was a big victory for Iceland and its interest groups.
Norges Fiskarlag did participate in the Norwegian delegation during the 1997
negotiations. This round added the European Union (EU) to the existing agreement. The 7%
share of the TAC given to the EU was achieved by Norway reducing its share by 5
percentage points and Iceland by 2 percentage points. Hence, Norway reduced its share by
about 7.5% and Iceland by 11.7%. The Icelandic interest groups were vehemently opposed to
giving anything to the European Union and in the end, the cost of including the EU in the
agreement was borne by the Norwegians, whose interest groups already were dissatisfied
with a small Norwegian share from the year before. But the protests by Norges Fiskarlag
were for naught as the political cost for the Norwegian government ignoring the interest
group’s demands at that point were limited.
Cod
Cod is the most important fishery in Norway and Iceland; generating more than 30% of the
value of fish exports in both Iceland and Norway. The economic importance of the fishery
gives interest groups a strong incentive to influence government policy, both domestically
and internationally. In 1993, facing declining catches at home, Icelandic trawlers began to
fish for Arctic cod in international waters between the economic zones of Norway and
Russia, the so-called Loop Hole. Icelandic vessel owners initiated this push into the high
seas, claiming historical rights dating back to the early 1950s. This claim was tenuous at best
43. Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 1999.
44. Anonymous 1996b.
45. Personal interview with a Norwegian interest group leader. Interview conducted in Norway, June 16, 1999.
46. Anonymous 1996a.

14

as the Icelandic fishery in the area was never of much significance. The conflict was highly
political from the start and the distance between the parties was great. The first round of
negotiations in 1993 failed completely, the negotiations broke down again in 1996. Finally,
with a new government in power in Norway in 1997, the negotiations resumed and were
concluded in 1999.
Following the resumption of the negotiations in 1997, interest groups were kept out of
the negotiations altogether, mainly because the Norwegian interest groups opposed any
agreement with Iceland. In interviews, the Icelandic interest group leaders seemed much less
bothered by this than their Norwegian counterparts. This was because the Icelandic interest
groups work more closely with the government in general. Icelandic interest group leaders
were relatively content with the agreement, while Norges Fiskarlag was furious. In
conclusion it can be said that Iceland and Norway were able to reach an agreement by
excluding Norges Fiskarlag from the delegation. Had the government included Norges
Fiskarlag, it would have been much more difficult for the government to solve the conflict as
Norges Fiskarlag was completely opposed to any agreement with Icelanders. But leaving the
interest groups behind gave the Norwegian government more leeway to solve the conflict
without having to fight a simultaneous battle with the interest group. And the Norwegian
government was able to do so, as by this point, the ability of the fishing industry to levy
political costs is practically none.
Oceanic Redfish
The negotiations over oceanic redfish were markedly less political than the other negotiations
discussed here, primarily because this is a relatively new fishery, with Iceland reporting its
first catches in 1989 and Norway in 1990. In addition, the conflict was primarily between
Iceland and Greenland on the one hand and Russia on the other. The Soviet Union was the
first nation to begin fishing from the stock in 1982 and Russia was loath to give up its
historical rights to the fishery. Given the newness of the fishery, and its location far from
shore, little scientific information existed on the stock, which made the negotiations
problematic initially. The most remarkable thing about the negotiations is that Iceland and
Greenland, the two coastal states in question, agreed to refer the management of the stock,
including any share of the stock found in domestic waters, to the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), a regional fisheries organization. The organization
established a working group that was led by a Norwegian official from the Directorate of
Fisheries and the goal of the working group was to develop suggestions about how to divide
the stock among participants in the fishery. Norway was a small participant in the fishery and
a high-seas fishing state, and thus not a major player in the negotiations. Interest groups were
included in the negotiations over oceanic redfish, but their preferences and actions remain
unclear. In Iceland, the Vessel Owners were happy with the agreement. 47 There is no
information on Norges Fiskarlag’s reaction to the agreement.
8. Conclusions
The literature on the domestic influence on international cooperation has paid scant attention
to the impact of interest groups on the distributive outcomes of negotiations. In the context of
cooperation between Iceland and Norway over shared fish stocks, it is clear that interest
groups can and do directly influence the outcome of the negotiations by restricting the
alternatives available for the negotiators. The evidence presented here suggests that the
47. Anonymous 1996c.
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presence of powerful interest groups results in greater TAC. This interest group influence is
independent of political institutions such as the legislature. As Tarar shows, highly
constrained negotiators facing negotiators who are less constrained have a bargaining
advantage. 48 This is clearly the case between Iceland and Norway.
The fact that the Icelandic interest groups have remained strong during 20 years of
negotiations while Norges Fiskarlag’s influence has steadily declined has resulted in an
increasingly skewed bargaining position for Norway. As a result, Iceland has been able to get
its way in deciding which solution concept to use, which in turn has given Iceland a greater
share of the resources than strict application of zonal attachment should indicate. By being
able to influence the choice of either historical rights or zonal attachment, Icelandic
negotiators have secured a more favorable outcome for Icelandic fishermen in the
negotiations.
Only during the first Capelin negotiations that ended in 1980 are the interest groups
on both sides equally powerful. In the early 1980s, the power of the Norwegian interest
groups began to wane, leading to lesser ability to influence the Norwegian bargaining
position. As detailed earlier, the Icelandic Vessel Owners retained or increased its power with
regards to the government, which meant they were able to put more constraints on the
Icelandic negotiating position, i.e. allowing negotiators limited room to offer and accept
bargains. After that the Icelandic interest groups have an advantage, leading to better
outcomes for Iceland in each of the subsequent negotiations.
The research shows that when explaining the distributional outcome of international
negotiations, it is important to look at the role of domestic groups in the bargaining process.
In addition this research shows the importance of broadening the question of international
cooperation to explore systematically the actual outcomes of negotiations, not only whether
or not states cooperate. By doing so, we expand the range of the dependent variable and can
thus better identify the different influences that come into play in international cooperation.
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